Chinese overtures

Courtesy: IISS

There were high expectations for this year's Shangri-La Dialogue. The event is organised by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), the famous London-based think-tank that holds the annual conference where defence ministers, senior servicemen and policy analysts meet to promote transparency and the exchange of information on Asia-Pacific security affairs. As its chief executive Dr. Chipman pointed out, the dialogue convened "after a year of heightened tensions in the Asia-Pacific, recognising that defence diplomacy is needed to contain disputes, limit provocations and inspire conflict prevention."

There were arguably three main issues that gathered the biggest attention throughout the past year: cyber security, and North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile programs, and territorial disputes. I will focus on the latter.

In a last PacNet article, Bonnie Glaser expressed great dissatisfaction with China's "missed opportunity" at the Shangri-La Dialogue. Obviously, the speech by China's top representative to the dialogue were anxiously awaited by virtually all the other delegations. Consequently, Glaser pointed her guns at China's Deputy Chief of the PLA General Staff Lt. Gen. Qi Jianguo. Lt. Gen. Qi, the author argued, "delivered a speech full of platitudes that failed to confront the region's serious security issues." Glaser stated a comprehensive list of security concerns that were surely present in most of the other delegates' minds, but failed to be addressed.

"Inquiries went largely unanswered regarding such issues as China's use of paramilitary vessels to alter the status quo in the South China Sea and East China Sea; China's rejection of arbitration by the international tribunal on the Law of the Sea despite its being a signatory of UNCLOS; whether Beijing disputes Japan's sovereignty over Okinawa and other islands in the Ryukyu chain; the recent incursion by Chinese troops into the Indian-controlled territory of Ladakh; and if China is seriously weighing joining the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations."

But was is truly a missed opportunity? I am yet to watch the video, which I hope may provide some hints regarding non-verbal communication such as body language, intonation, pauses, tone, and so forth, but there is one important takeaway I would like to emphasise.* In Lt. Gen. Qi's presentation we might have witnessed the first solid reference to an intention to shelve the territorial disputes, namely in the East and South China Seas. At the end of page 4 of the prepared English translation, it reads:

"We should put aside disputes, work in the same direction and seek solutions through dialogue and coordination, particularly when it comes to disputes concerning sovereignty as well as maritime rights and interests."

If this proves to be the beginning of a Chinese overture toward ongoing territorial disputes, it may very well prove Glaser wrong in claiming this was a missed opportunity. Although addressing this multifaceted security issue will require engaging in intensive debates on all the issues that were left unanswered, it may prove to be a necessary first step that many in the audience were waiting for. And since the Shangri-La Dialogue is as much about transparency as it is about negotiations on the sidelines, I would not be too dismissive of official Chinese statements in a venue such as the SLD. The question is, will we observe a return to Deng Xiaoping's policy?

* Lt. Gen. Qi Jianguo's video presentation was not available at the time of posting.

This article has been written by:

Tiago Alexandre Fernandes Mauricio

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"TICAD or TICJAD?" by Virgil Hawkins.

We are honored to have the permission to crosspost the recent blog article of Professor Virgil Hawkins (Osaka University), author of the book "Stealth Conflicts" and one of the project coordinators at the Southern African Centre for Collaboration on Peace and Security (SACCPS). 

"TICAD or TICJAD?" by Virgil Hawkins.

The Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) opened today in Yokohama, Japan. It is the fifth such TICAD conference, in which African heads of state and other representatives are invited to Japan by the Japanese government every five years, ostensibly for the purpose of furthering and supporting Africa’s development.

Japan’s Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, has pledged a hefty sum of money in aid for Africa, and, provided that this pledge is followed through and put to good use, it should certainly contribute to the development of Africa. But we should harbour no illusions that the conference (or the pledge) is an altruistic gesture, or that African development is the primary objective of the process. The Prime Minister has scheduled, for example, a summit with African leaders on UN Security Council reform (not a topic that one might readily associate with African development) – Japan hopes to receive support for its bid for a permanent seat on that Council. More importantly, the summit has much to do with securing African natural resources for Japan, promoting Africa as a market for Japanese goods, and competing in this regard with rivals in Asia – China and South Korea.

The choice of venue (outside of Africa) has always raised questions. With no apparent irony, the statement produced in Japan after the last such conference in 2008 stated in its introduction that “…from its inception in 1993, the TICAD Process, with Japan at its center … stressed the importance for Africa to exercise full ‘ownership’ of its own development agenda…”. It seems somewhat difficult to reconcile the notion of full African ownership with the fact that this particular process has Japan “at its centre”, is held in Japan, and is wrapped up in a text entitled the ‘Yokohama Declaration’.

The media in Japan seem to have very clear ideas about what TICAD V is all about. A television program (Close-up Gendai) aired by the national broadcaster (NHK) two days before the conference kicked off, for example, focused primarily on Japan’s public and private partnerships being employed to maximise Japanese benefits from Africa’s current economic growth. The program, whose title roughly translates as “Capture Africa’s Growth: Team Japan’s New Strategy”, featured a segment (‘Secure soy beans through Team Japan’) showing how the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA: Japan’s governmental agency that coordinates official development assistance) was strategically using training and infrastructure projects to help secure a large supply of soy beans from Mozambique for Japanese trading companies and producers. A JICA official involved in the project went on record proudly stating that he was serving as a “businessman for Team Japan”. 

There is nothing wrong with the self-interested promotion of business as a win-win means of furthering development – Africa certainly needs trade more than it needs aid. But the key question that is not being addressed here (apart from the unabashed use of ODA to directly support business interests back home) is – is it a fair deal? It may well be true that Mozambican farmers can benefit from growing soy beans and selling them to Japanese trading companies. But poor farmers becoming slightly less poor is not the same thing as those farmers getting a fair price for their produce. The exceptionally cheap cost of production (read exceptionally cheap labour) is, of course, the prime reason why Japanese companies are attempting to procure soy beans from farmland 13,000 kilometres away from their intended market.

If government statements and media coverage in Japan are anything to go by, TICAD is seen in Japan primarily as a vehicle to take advantage of growing African economies for the furthering of Japanese economic and political interests. And although a large pledge of Japanese aid to Africa has been made, very little has being mentioned in the lead up to the conference about actual African development. The narrative has been dominated by the perceived need to get in on the action and benefit from a rising Africa, and to counter the influence on the continent of China and Korea.

With all this in mind, one is tempted to rename the process from TICAD to TICJAD – the Tokyo International Conference on Japanese and (hopefully also) African Development.

Author: Virgil Hawkins

This article has been published by:

Rui Faro Saraiva

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On Japan's Negative Nationalism...

Given the kind interest of Gavan Gray in continuing the debate about Japan's soft power in the context of the recent public declarations of Ishihara and Hashimoto, I would like to add some more thoughts, starting by quoting George Orwell on nationalism: 

"A nationalist is one who thinks solely, or mainly, in terms of competitive prestige. He may be a positive or a negative nationalist — that is, he may use his mental energy either in boosting or in denigrating — but at any rate his thoughts always turn on victories, defeats, triumphs and humiliations. He sees history, especially contemporary history, as the endless rise and decline of great power units, and every event that happens seems to him a demonstration that his own side is on the upgrade and some hated rival is on the downgrade. But finally, it is important not to confuse nationalism with mere worship of success. The nationalist does not go on the principle of simply ganging up with the strongest side. On the contrary, having picked his side, he persuades himself that it is the strongest, and is able to stick to his belief even when the facts are overwhelmingly against him. Nationalism is power-hunger tempered by self-deception. Every nationalist is capable of the most flagrant dishonesty, but he is also — since he is conscious of serving something bigger than himself — unshakeably certain of being in the right" (in "Notes on Nationalism").

If Hashimoto's or Ishihara's comments were seen as positive, there were no reasons for foreign representatives, international media, international institutions (e.g. UN) or NGOs (e.g. Amnesty international), to react to such declarations.

Ishihara and Hashimoto are the co-leaders of the Japan Restoration Party (Nippon Ishin no Kai) . What is there to be restored? Well we can start by looking at the first point of Nippon Ishin no Kai's political programme (kind translation of Seiko Sakuragi): 

"In order to lead the nation and the ethnic group (Minzoku, “Min” means people, “zoku” means race or tribe) to true independence as well as to revive the nation, we will make a major revision of the constitution which demeaned Japan to be isolated and to be a subject for contempt, and which is the source of enforcement of an unrealistic community illusion called “peace at any principle.”

This seems to be a clear hint of what kind of nationalism is going to be promoted by the Japan Restoration Party, the revival of the Yamato race myth and the ghosts of what brought Japan into disgrace not so long ago.

Gavan said: "I do not think though, that Japan needs to worry about world opinion." Well Hashimoto and Ishihara seem to share the same opinion. But I do believe that this is exactly what a policymaker should not have as a principle in the 21st century global information age. The world was never so interdependent as today. I will quote Professor Nye from here:

"There are, then, two models of how soft power affects its targets: direct and indirect. In the direct form, leaders may be attracted and persuaded by the benignity, competence, or charisma of other leaders (...). Elite relations and networks often play an important role. More common, however, is a two-step model in which publics and third parties are influenced, and they in turn affect the leaders of other countries. In this case, soft power has an important indirect effect by creating an enabling environment for decisions. Alternatively, if an actor or action is perceived as repulsive, it creates a disabling environment" (in "The Future of Power").

A Soft Power strategy is not the solution for all the problems and challenges Japan is and will be facing. However to convert Japan's soft power resources into effective soft power seem to be a valuable reference that Japanese diplomats and policymakers should take into account in the coming years. In this context and as Gavan Gray underlines, "respect is earned through deeds, acts of moral, intellectual and scientific merit. It is earned by having a people who embrace ideas of innovation, curiosity and exploration, who uphold values of good manners, hard-work and empathy." 

Having no taboos while addressing issues in a proper time and fashion seems to be an important task for the Japanese society as a whole. Maybe Hashimoto and Ishihara wanted the debate on certain issues or perspectives, but it turns out that it is also debatable and important to address the recent neo-nationalistic trends present in Japanese politics.

Soon I will write a post here on the LDP draft for a new Japanese constitution. The topic is in essence related with this one.

This article has been written by:

Rui Faro Saraiva

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Nationalism and 'Prestige': The battle between self and national interest

In a recent article my colleague Rui Faro Saraiva, referred to comments by Osaka mayor Hashimoto Toru, as having damaged “Japan's international prestige and reputation”. I think it is important to point out that, as far as his comments regarding the comfort women go, Hashimoto clarified that he had intended to say that militaries in the past “seemed to need” systems of militarized prostitution and he believed this had been taken out of context to suggest he felt such systems were necessary. Given his advice to US troops, however, it is unclear what his true feelings on the subject are and, as such, his later statement that the comfort system was “an inexcusable act” may not be entirely sincere.

That aside, it strikes me as odd that an apology to the US forces should be seen as being at the top of his to-do list. Others think an apology to the comfort women would be more appropriate, yet there are two other groups that trump both in terms of offense.

Suggesting that US soldiers sate themselves on prostitutes rather than other women simply passes on abuse and violence to a group whose human rights are seriously compromised by the nebulous legality of the field which they work within. This casual disregard for the welfare of sex workers has been at the root of the mistreatment of millions of Asian women throughout history in both the peace-time and militarized sex industries.

Perhaps more importantly, in relation to Japan’s foreign policy at least, the suggestion that a foreign military force, residing in Japan during peace-time, is faced within an either/or choice of committing rape or using local prostitution, should be seen as grossly offensive to the Okinawan people. The idea that either the ongoing crimes of the US military, or the presence of an unnaturally large, military-driven sex trade, should be tolerated is utterly dismissive of the impact such problems have had upon Okinawa. Apart from the vice itself, and the efforts made by those within the industry to lure more and more young women into it, military-driven prostitution has been shown to have a hugely negative impact on hosting communities in terms of alcoholism, drug-addiction, levels of child neglect and other social ills.

The US military has quite clear alternate choices available: promote stricter discipline, impose harsher punishments or reduce its presence significantly.

I can certainly understand any desire Hashimoto might have had to contrast the sexual misconduct of US troops with the criticism their government has for Japan’s past use of military prostitution. The issue is a particularly complex one and few are willing to address it in a purely neutral manner (my own recent article on the comfort women issue ran into similar problems. The article, and an explanation of what happened to it, can however, be found here).

Where Hashimoto falls down is his prioritization of wronged parties. He is, however, a politician and thus he can be expected to care most about the attitude of the most politically influential pressure group in Japan (the US government). This is where I feel my colleague Rui is mistaken in referring to him as a neo-nationalist. As is the case with Ishihara, I have seen little evidence that sincere nationalism rather than simple self-interest is driving such figures. Any nationalist with an ounce of sense is aware of the fundamental importance in building strong economic, academic, scientific and security ties with their closest neighbors and the demagogues profiting by stirring up divisive xenophobic rhetoric should in no way, shape or form be classified as nationalists.

When looking at the specific issue of the exploitation of women, efforts by Japanese to avoid any responsibility for the suffering of the comfort women, Koreans to divorce this from the Kijich'on system, or Americans to pass-the-buck on their complicity in the 'Recreation and Amusement Association', are not the actions of 'nationalists'. For people with a love of their nation, safeguarding the rights of that nation's wives, sisters and daughters by combatting ongoing exploitation in the form of the sex industry or human trafficking, would be a serious concern and would require acknowledgement of the wide scope of past and present exploitation.

That said, simply because I consider them motivated by self-interest, this doesn’t mean everything that they say is incorrect. There is an argument to be made in Hashimoto's statement that Japan should not be judged in isolation. Similarly, Rui’s quote of Ishihara regarding the double-standards through which Japan’s war is viewed is not entirely incorrect. Over-simplified and poorly worded perhaps but not a point of view that deserves to be dismissed out of hand. Is Japan well-served by letting figures of such questionable sincerity raise these questions though?

I do agree with Rui that Japan needs to think very carefully about how it uses its soft power. I do not think though, that Japan needs to worry about world opinion. Taking a strong moral stance on certain issues will offend some people. If Japan chose to support the Syrian government’s fight against foreign terrorists it would likely receive criticism from the US, France and the UK. In contrast, if proposed changes to Article 9 allowing for use of the military to protect “Japan’s peace and independence and the safety of its people as well as contribute to international peace and safety”, are used to participate in a Libya-style NATO bombing campaign, the US would perhaps praise Japan's 'moral fortitude', I’m sure though that others would find it morally reprehensible.

At present, however, Japan does not seem as concerned about soft-power as it is the accumulation of hard military might. Perhaps the government believes that the key to acquiring international respect is to emulate the US position of strength. Respect is not earned through force though, and acquiescing to another’s will through fear is a very different relationship. 

Respect is earned through deeds, acts of moral, intellectual and scientific merit. It is earned by having a people who embrace ideas of innovation, curiosity and exploration, who uphold values of good manners, hard-work and empathy. Japan, as a nation, is failing in many of these areas and little is being done to inculcate such ideals in the younger generation. Without fundamental changes in the way the education system works to shape young minds, the way media works to raise awareness of social and global ills and the way political parties work to guide their country on the world stage, little can be expected to change.

In the long run, the actions of individual self-serving demagogues can only have such impact if the underlying character of the nation is too weak to aspire to anything greater. Japan, as both a nation and a state, has the potential to be far more vibrant, dynamic and influential than it currently is, but to reach such heights it will require leaders who are unafraid to address difficult issues and capable of doing so in an eloquent and sincere manner, driven by a true desire to promote their nation's welfare, rather than the all-too-common desire to promote themselves.

This article has been written by:

Gavan Gray

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Japan's neo-nationalism versus Japan's Soft Power

Recent remarks by members of the Japan Restoration Party (Nippon Ishin no Kai) are causing international concern and damaging Japan's international prestige and reputation.

Hashimoto, the Mayor of Osaka, said: 

"In the circumstances in which bullets are flying like rain and wind, the soldiers are running around at the risk of losing their lives," "If you want them to have a rest in such a situation, a comfort women system is necessary. Anyone can understand that."

Ishihara, the co-leader of the Japan Restoration Party, added:

"(The war Japan fought) (WWII) was not aggression. General Douglas MacArthur told a congressional testimony that it was for self-defense.""Deprived of resources, (Japan) had no choice but to expand into Southeast Asia. White people could not allow Japanese, a colored people, to build a modern state.""If one defines the war as aggression without such a historical perspective, it merely amounts to masochism or ignorance of history.""In the modern era, all white people in Europe (colonized other parts of the world). The situation was the same throughout the world. It was an eat-or-be-eaten world in the modern era.""It is wrong if Japanese, without considering such historical developments, define their own history in accordance with the set of values determined by the Tokyo war crimes tribunal, which tends to see things in black and white terms."

Whether these declarations are the result of ideological trends inside the Japan Restoration Party or the lack of Hashimoto's or Ishihara's political ability to communicate with foreign publics, more attention should be given to the external perceptions about Japan in the context of the current information age.

Following these events, the UN recommended the Japanese government to better inform its society on the women forced into sexual slavery and to take necessary measures to repair the lasting effects of the exploitation and insure their right to compensation. In the same week, Amnesty International also criticized Japan's inaction on the issue of "comfort women" in its annual report on the state of human rights around the world, released on May 23.

If "soft power" relies on the constructed narrative about a political unit, Hashimoto's and Ishihara's contributions can only serve to create a negative image of a neo-nationalist Japan and awaken regional and global antagonistic trends.

Japanese political leaders need to recognize the importance of soft power while engaging directly or indirectly with foreign publics, otherwise the consequences will damage the perceptions about Japan's role in 21st century international politics.

This article has been written by:

Rui Faro Saraiva

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Breaking the cycle on North Korea

Kim Jong-un and Ri Sol-ju (Reuters)

Insanity is sometimes defined as doing the same thing over and over and expecting different results. If this is the case than all parties involved in negotiations with North Korea seem to have lost touch with reality. The past week has seen a new wave of pantomime theatre regarding the danger the North represents for its neighbours, something that never seems to lose its power despite the fact that the vast majority of security analysts are quite open about the inflated nature of the threat. Perhaps it comes down to the media's ability to frame heads of state such as Kim Jong Un, Kim Jong Il before him, Gadaffi and Hussein, in the manner of movie villains, playing into home audience expectations and reducing to black and white caricatures the domestic and foreign policies of incredibly complex societies. Certainly, if a more rational appraisal is made of North Korea the state, it soon becomes clear that the biggest danger might be that the 'rogue' state is too weak for anyone’s benefit.

North Korea is, due to decades of sanctions and poorly developed natural resources of its own, for all intents and purposes a third world country. It has limited electricity infrastructure, few heavy machining industries, an undersized agricultural sector that is far from self-sufficient and it is plagued by regular natural disasters. Millions of its population are under-nourished, hordes of homeless nomads and bandits threaten its internal stability and overall its GDP as a country is only half that of the city of Lisbon. The idea that this state will suddenly decide to commit national suicide by seriously threatening South Korea, the USA and Japan should be utterly ludicrous.

Yet, it is still portrayed that way. Whether their nuclear weapons tests, ballistic missiles or the most recent specter of a weaponized Electro-Magnetic Pulse (EMP), it is always suggested that this tiny country can somehow play David to three first world Goliaths. Recently the Director of the US Task Force on National and Homeland Security went so far as to suggest that an "EMP apocalypse" unleashed by North Korea could devastate the entire United States.

It goes without saying that North Korea presents a slightly unstable front, with frequent sabre-rattling accompanied by over the top threats to reign doom upon their foes. Occasionally, as was the case with Yeonpyeong Island, these threats even carry through to displays of force. It should be understandable, however, that if you are a state short on resources and military power, and surrounded by potential foes, you will want to make yourself seem as scary as possible. Lacking any major weapon systems of real utility, bluff and feigning unpredictability are among the few tactical cards you can play.

Certainly, EMP weapons, requiring both a robust nuclear program and advanced ballistic missile technology, seem pure fear-mongering. While the nuclear program is ongoing there is no evidence that it is improving in either miniaturization or relative yield. Recent tests have suggested a higher overall yield (still a fraction of that produced by the earliest WWII-era American weapons) but this might simply be from the expenditure of more material, i.e. a bigger bomb, rather than a better one. A recent RAND report (by Marcus Schiller) found both the nuclear and missile programs to be technologically weak and in need of far more testing to produce a viable threat. Even in this case the threats were seen as being relatively easy to counter. More importantly, the report highlighted the symbolic aspect of the North’s test programs.

Generally, North Korea engages in nuclear or missile tests as a tool of statesmanship rather than to improve the weapons programs themselves. Missile tests have thus far occurred on only a handful of occasions, each with foreign or domestic symbolism. Two sets of tests were conducted on and around July 4th (Independence Day) and were considered primarily a show of defiance to the US. Other tests were seen to be directed at the North’s own citizenry, e.g. heralding the consolidation of power by Kim Jong Il or the 100th birthday of Kim Jong Sung. Nuclear testing also often follows a pattern of symbolic gesture with the latest test in February 2013 claimed by North Korean sources to be a response to sanctions imposed for its December 2012 testing of the Unha-3 delivery system. In 2012 the annual threat assessment provided by the US intelligence community was of the opinion that the North’s missile and nuclear systems would only ever be used defensively and even then if only on the verge of a conventional military defeat.

If this is the case and no serious threat is perceived, why continue to impose sanctions that cripple the North’s internal development and slow down reform? If the hope is to promote enough internal instability to bring down the current regime, the actual effects are only likely to create a humanitarian crisis in the North and a financial one in the South. A sudden collapse of the regime could lead to mass refugee migration, widespread starvation, internal war and black-market trading in WMDs. Numerous studies have estimated the cost of rebuilding a collapsed North Korea as being several trillions of dollars, a burden that would fall largely on South Korea (whose annual budget of $754 billion is far from capable of handling such an eventuality). The process would take years of hardship, suffering and potential conflict, with no guarantee that the end result would be any more stable than the North is now.

Given that this option seem entirely detrimental to the security of the North’s current neighbors, what other choices are available? The answer can be seen in recent evidence that internal reforms are taking place within the North. Last year a high-ranking general was removed from power, apparently due to his opposition to economic reforms being carried out by Kim Jong Un. This was only part of a wider curtailment of the privileges of the senior military command that coincided with the dispatch of North Korean scholars to China in order to study the latter’s embrace of limited capitalism. While small, such steps clearly show an alternate path to the cycle of ‘sanction – weapons test – sanction – weapons test’.

The ‘inventor’s paradox’ is a heuristic process that recommends finding a broader solution that obviates the need for a more specific one. In the case of North Korea’s WMDs it is clear to see they only exist as a response to the threat to its sovereignty the North (rightfully or wrongly) perceives. Rather than focusing on the weapons it therefore seems to make more sense to reduce this threat level. Supporting the North’s internal stability through industrial development and agricultural production will allow for the possibility of political or economic reform and remove both the need for WMDs and the danger of sudden collapse. Doing so, however, requires political leaders to refrain from rising to the bait of recent or forthcoming tests and instead offering gestures of support, something that can make them look weak to their electorate, regardless of how well it may serve the latter group’s future security.

It also requires politicians to be acting in good faith, i.e. sincerely seeking a way to reduce regional tensions. It can be argued that the presence of an unstable North Korea is very much a plus in pragmatic terms for US realpolitik. It generates a sense of threat in both South Korea and Japan, binding them closer to their larger ally and allowing for the development of weapons systems and military capability that will prove highly beneficial to US efforts at containing Chinese growth. However, for states with more fundamental benefits to be found in promoting regional stability, it must be remembered that the North’s WMD program is not the problem but rather a symptom of an underlying problem. In addressing this political leaders should keep in mind that their end goal is not to halt the weapons tests but to help integrate a stable North Korea into the regional community in a peaceful and mutually beneficial manner.

If an adult is bitten by a puppy, kicking the animal is one way to teach it that what it did is wrong. Yet, when the threat to the adult is so mild, they also have the option of simply waiting and letting the puppy realize there is no danger present. What is chosen depends very much on the type of relationship you hope to establish: that of master/slave or one of mutual respect. If the former, then the current path (imposing sanctions, ratcheting up tensions and promoting the idea of the North as existential threat) is only likely to increase the chance of conflict or regime collapse without doing anything to improve the lives of the North’s citizenry. If, however, a more positive relationship is the end goal then the issue of weapons testing is merely a distraction from other initiatives that can help stabilize the North’s infrastructure, boost the quality of life of its residents and build an atmosphere of trust in which fundamental reforms have a chance of success. If choosing the latter, a first step will be to promote more balanced media coverage of the North that focuses less on the immediate and highly unlikely threat of WMDs, and more upon the future and the potential benefits of positive engagement.

This article has been written by:

Gavan Gray

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Fighting against disaster

Tohoku 2011 (Google)

It goes without saying that protecting national security is the primary aim of the Ministry of Defense (MoD) yet in most nations people rarely associate this with disaster relief. The view of security has certainly broadened since the concept of 'Human Security' was highlighted in the 1994 UN Human Development Report, nontheless, most nations still associate 'military' with guns, tanks and jets.

Japan, of course, is not most nations. Sitting on the 'Ring of Fire’, an arc of unstable seismic activity that encircles the Pacific Basin, Japan's islands are host to regular earthquakes, as well as heavy annual typhoons, that leave them in constant threat from mother nature. The 2011 Tohoku disaster brought home the truly terrifying potential scale of such events. In a single day an earthquake, tsunami and nuclear meltdown brought the nation to its knees, with over 15,000 lives lost and total damage estimated at \21 trillion.

The JSDF responded admirably in the crisis, deploying almost half their entire personnel to the disaster zone and toiling for weeks in horrendous conditions. Their efforts helped boost their public profile considerably, with many people seeing this as precisely the type of civic assistance as 'defense force' should excel at. Since then the JSDF have been involved in numerous other relief operations, such as when they provided vital supplies to thousands of people cut off by flooding in Kyushu. In fact, this was only one of some 586 disaster relief operations carried out by the JSDF in 2011 alone. The vast majority of these (444) involving the transport of emergency patients.

JSDF Disaster Relief (LA Times)

The 2011 disaster should not, however, be seen as an anomaly. Japan is criss-crossed by hundreds of old-fault lines that could snap at any moment and the chance is far higher in the wake of the Tohoku earthquake. While the scientific ability to predict quakes is highly contested, seismologists who before 2011 had suggested a 0.5% chance of a major quake hitting Tokyo in the coming decades, have revised their estimates up to 35-50%. Studies of the potential effects of such a quake hitting the capital suggest a magnitude-7 quake might inflict 11,000 deaths, render 850,000 buildings useless and cause up to \80 trillion in damages. This is also far from a worst-case scenario, the 1923 Great Tokyo Earthquake was magnitude-8 (32 times stronger than a 7). Numerous other cities have also been assessed as standing at an 80% risk of major quakes over the next 30 years.

Japan is perhaps the most well-prepared nation in the world for such events but this hardly means that more could not be done. Of 57 areas of appraisal covered by the MoD's post-Tohoku 'Lessons Learned' self evaluation, 34 were seen as needing further improvement. No doubt these points will be addressed but to have a real impact will require a serious investment of funds. For example, the pre-instillation of facilities and equipment at evacuation centers, the provision of 4 wheel drive jeeps and trucks to transport medical teams, or the commissioning of hospital ships (preferably with well-decks and ample helicopter support).

None of these seem to be priorities however. In fact, the 2012 MoD budget allocated only \9.7 billion for enhancing disaster preparedness. This might seem like a lot if judged in isolation. Considering though, that the planned acquisition of 42 F-35s might cost \90 billion per year for 20 years, and that another \100+ billion is being allocated annually to missile defense, it raises the question of whether the most likely dangers are being addressed. The threat from North Korea is generally accepted by analysts as being far smaller than commonly portrayed by either the media or politicians. That of China can be offset to some extent by trade, diplomacy or maintaining a limited deterrent. The threat of natural disaster, however, cannot be avoided and yet people seem somehow more blasé about it. Determining whether this is due to the romanticization of military affairs or pessimistic fatalism is not nearly as important as deciding whether it makes common sense in regard the allocation of national security resources.

This article has been written by:

Gavan Gray

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Dogmatism and Compromise: Part II

Well its gone again. In publishing my recent article it seems there was a failure to catch some errors in content and referencing (most of these resulting from a single error that had left several citations with the wrong reference, in most cases throwing the page number slightly off). Though the actual information involved appears to be completely accurate, some critics used the mistakes to suggest that the information was non-existent (information they surely knew was correct). Although the errors were easy to quickly address and I pointed out that the underlying information was quite accurate (though I did agree with some comments that more context could have been provided in places), EJCJS decided to temporarily pull the article. For my own part I have no interest in spending any more time on a subject outside my own sphere of study, particularly one so full of anger and recrimination, and would be quite happy now if the piece was simply removed.

More importantly, it seems many missed the point of the article entirely, which was not to evade Japan's responsibility but rather to show that what Japan had done was not unique. This in no way negates the exploitation that occurred in the comfort system. It merely frames it in a wider context. The very first paragraph mentioned works by Wakabayashi, Tanaka and Soh, and anyone familiar with the issue would be aware of these and know quite well from them that the article's key message should not have been particularly controversial. And yet, the response was far more vitriolic than I had expected (from some, there were an equal number of complimentary voices). I had thought that perhaps people were just set in their views and had a difficult time seeing things from the opposite side's perspective. Now though, I have begun to wonder if some actually lack a sincere interest in reaching a solution.

To such people I would like to ask "What have you done lately to resolve the issue?"

Writing articles to allies on the left or right? Preaching to the choir?

The choices are very clear. Japan will never give an apology that meets all of the redress movement's current demands. South Korea will never simply drop the issue. The only realistic options are to continue as things stand or to reach a compromise.

Doing so means reaching out to the other side, attempting to understand exactly why they see things differently and trying to identify the things you can agree upon. In my view the clearest compromise is for South Korea and the US to accept responsibility for similar past misdeeds and for the three to unite in a gesture of mutual atonement.

Anyone who immediately begins thinking about "whose crime was greater" has missed the entire point.

Women were exploited in debt bondage by Japanese society before the War. They were exploited in the comfort system by the Japanese military. Japanese women were exploited by the USA in the RAA system. And, South Korean women were exploited by their own government in its camptowns. They also continue to be exploited every passing day in the form of human trafficking in each of these countries. Which of these groups of women does not deserve consideration and remembrance? It goes without saying the suffering is wider than that, but to address the comfort women question requires addressing the wider exploitation of Asian women.

Some might say, "But there are still unanswered questions regarding the comfort system."

What questions would these be? Were specific women willing participants, deceived or even forcibly recruited? How does it matter? We know that countless women were exploited.

Were the majority from Korea or Japan? Again, how does it matter? We know women from both countries were used and left destitute after the war.

Are specific tales by the women true or false? Once more, how does it matter? We know there was abuse and cruelty taking place in many parts of the system.

In the article I was attempting to show that the case against Japan was not as black and white as often portrayed, not to suggest that there was no case to be made. By this point, the comfort women are, regardless of how you individually feel about the subject, a symbol of the suffering of Asian women in the twentieth century. For 20 years, narrowing the question down to a simple issue of 'Japan's guilt vs. the women's victimhood' has failed to reach any lasting resolution of the problem or improvement of Asian women's rights. The need for a broader view should be clear but this does not preclude the women from remaining symbols of exploitation. They would merely expand their role to stand for a far greater number of women in many more places and times.

Some people, however, do not seem comfortable with this idea, and that is something I just don't understand.

This article has been written by:

Gavan Gray

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The Comfort Women: Dogmatism and Compromise

I recently had a piece I wrote last year, on the subject of the Comfort Women, published at the Electronic Journal of Contemporary Japanese Studies. Though still quite long it was perhaps rendered less readable due heavy editing (down from about 30,000 words in the first draft) with a focus on academic points rather than style. The central argument, however, is quite easy to grasp, namely that Japan’s crimes have been greatly exaggerated by states that have carried out equivalent, if not worse, crimes without any attempt to acknowledge or address their own failings.

The topic is still politically relevant and controversial and I expected some negative response as many of those involved in the issue have become deeply entrenched in their views. What I was surprised by is that all the criticism thus far received has completely avoided the central argument and instead focused either on irrational appeals or pedantry.

In the former group I’ve had Professors with experience in the subject state simply that “Japan needs to apologize” without giving any reason why this should be the case or why previous apologies are insufficient. Others have said that I did not give enough attention to the suffering of “colonial Korea” or openly stated their opposition was because it might bolster “conservative arguments”. In each case I was struck by the failure to, in any way, address the validity, or lack thereof, of the central thesis.

Perhaps the most glaring example of this was a blog post by Michael Cucek which pedantically focuses on stylistic issues and several comments that show a glaring lack of academic understanding. Though each is quite debatable, I would gladly concede arguments of style as they are utterly irrelevant to any of the key arguments. Unfortunately, Cucek extends his pompous judgment of “basic rules” to academic points he is clearly not fit to critique. Among other easily dissected comments:

• He rejects Nishioka Tsutomu as an acceptable source due to his being “an internationally famous Japanese revisionist” as though this has any bearing on the validity of Nishioka’s information.
• He suggests the piece’s length is itself evidence of weakness, an argument that would render all books on the subject worthless. The CW issue is one which particularly requires a broader understanding of the historical and political background, details which many who are involved in the debate seem to be lacking, and ideally I would have liked to include more information.
• He links to a report, referenced in the article, which discusses Imperial Japanese policy on sexual sanitation. Despite Cucek’s hyperbolic warning that reading it will leave you “shivering” there is nothing in the document that should not be familiar to anyone with any knowledge of subject and it is in fact a relatively dry piece that specifically references the European practices Japan’s procedures were based upon. It offers nothing that undercuts the point for which it was used and in deeper reading actually reinforces the central arguments of my article.

The original article is quite long and has more than enough citations for such pedants to pick through it for minutiae to gnaw upon. Hopefully in future I can simply reference them here. Using such easily-countered attacks on minor points as justification for rejecting the broader arguments of the article speak far more of an emotional, or pride-driven, response than neutral and critical analysis. A great number of people who support the comfort women activists have done so for more than a decade. Speaking out on the subject, or attacking politicians such as Aso or Abe for white-washing history, obviously makes it difficult for them to retract past statements. Whether you call it cognitive dissonance, entrenchment or simple pride, it can be very hard, even for the most well-educated to admit that a long and passionately held view might be unsound.

In researching the subject I was forced to overcome my own previous beliefs that right-wing Japanese politicians and academics were motivated purely by national pride or political goals. The evidence I found forced a difficult but unavoidable reappraisal of those views. As it stands, I actually have no dog in this fight. Japanese and Korean security is vastly improved by setting the comfort women issue to rest and doing so requires establishing an accepted view of the past that both sides can live with. As such, if the arguments in the article are shown to be wrong I would happily and easily set them aside.

At the very least, resolution of issues such as this requires the same mindset as an argument with one’s spouse. You may feel you are 100% in the right but for the sake of a healthy marriage you should always be willing to compromise a little. In other words, diplomacy can never aim for a one-sided victory, as resentment felt by the other side over loss of face will stagnate over time. Thus, the solution to this and other historical issues, and to the ongoing territorial disputes, will always take the form of a compromise and both sides should realize that dogmatism can only perpetuate insecurity.

The only people who can benefit from an emotional approach to the subject are those who hope to mine it for political leverage, people who clearly have no interest in historical truth, the welfare of women or the future security of Japan and the two Koreas. Calling such people 'nationalists' is overlooking the clear evidence that they have no sincere interest in promoting the national security of their country and are instead driven by purely selfish aims. Assuming you are not such a demagogue, I would suggest that you reappraise your views on the subject to see how much stems from neutral analysis and how much from political baggage.

This article has been written by:

Gavan Gray

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China's noose? The Senkaku/Diaoyu/Tiaoyutai Islands dispute in context

Has China found another "noose" to constrain the United States in the Asia-Pacific region? Courtesy: The Guardian

The implications of recent tensions over the Senkaku/Diaoyu/Tiaoyutai Islands are far-reaching and not easily scrutable. Although most would agree that no definite resolution is in sight, opinions diverge over what appropriate policy can be pursued in order to guarantee some degree of predictability. 

Given the instability of current situation, however, Japan, China and Taiwan are hedging in an attempt to prevent their relative positions from weakening due to unexpected developments. For Japan - and indeed Taiwan -, this has included taking steps to reinforce the bilateral security agreement with the United States. In its turn, the United States has refused to fully and openly commit to the defence of its allies' offshore islands at the expenses of its Asia-Pacific strategy vis-à-vis China. Whereas Japan sees the Senkaku Islands as an inalienable part of its sovereign territory, for most American observers they are perceived as "a bunch of rocks" of no real importance whatsoever.

The dramatic events of last year, however, have catapulted this dispute to a whole new level.

Convinced that their own credibility as well as Hu Jintao's was now at risk, Obama and Clinton let it be known early in 2012 that they were now prepared to defend the Senkaku Islands, if necessary with military force. China then moved to defuse the crisis, but two significant points had been made. One was that another ally [Japan] had extracted a security commitment from the United States by advertising its weakness. The other was that Washington had relinquished the initiative to Hu, for as the Chinese leader later explained, by sticking their necks out over Senkaku, the Americans had handed him a noose, which he could relax - or tighten - at will.

Let us pause, for the above paragraph demands closer attention. The passage is based upon John Lewis Gaddis's (2006) analysis of the Quemoy and Matsu Islands dispute between China and Taiwan in the 1950s. And yet it bears a strange resemblance with what has been the situation surrounding the Sino-Japanese dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu/Tiaoyutai Islands in the East China Sea.

The first noose Communist China used to influence U.S. policy in the region. Courtesy: CNN

Here is the original quote:

Convinced that their own credibility as well as Chiang's was now at risk, Eisenhower and Dulles let it be known early in 1955 that they were now prepared to defend the most important islands, Quemoy and Matsu, if necessary with nuclear weapons. Mao then moved to defuse the crisis, but two significant had been made. One was that another ally had extracted a security commitment from the United States by advertising its weakness. The other was that Washington had relinquished the initiative to Mao, for as the Chinese leader later explained, by sticking their necks out over Quemoy and Matsu, the Americans had handed him a noose, which he could relax - or tighten - at will.

To argue that China's recent moves are part of a new strategy to expand its power and influence in its near-abroad is thus shortsighted. They are arguably one of its constitutive elements, but they are certainly not new, nor are they the defining features of it. 

This article has been written by:

Tiago Alexandre Fernandes Mauricio

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On raumsinn, or sense of space, in East Asia

World population flows. Courtesy: La Documentation Française

I have previously called for the need to revisit some of the works of classical geopolitics in order to shed light into some of the security problems in East Asia. I strongly believe those works constitute valuable sources in the development of informed debates and ultimately contribute to better policymaking. The German School of Geopolitics, granted it can in fact be called as such, is particularly instructive in this regard.

In hindsight, however, the theses penned by authors like Friedrich Ratzel, Rudolph Kjëllen, Carl Ritter, Karl Haushofer, and others have some methodological deficiencies which cannot be overlooked. These deficiencies will be especially prominent to prophets and acolytes of today's scientific standards, especially in political science departments where statistical analysis and rational theory set the pace of research projects. These "social scientists" might go so far as utterly dismissing the insights produced by nearly one century of academic enquiry (1860s-1940s), but looking at the undercurrents of strategic behaviour of countries like Japan, China, Russia, one is at least compelled to submit classical geopolitics to more attentive scholarship.

Friedrich Ratzel. Courtesy: Wikipedia

One of the defining concepts of the said German School was Raumsinn, or sense of space, extensively explored by Ratzel. It expresses the idea, in wide circulation at the time, that particular communities have a greater or lesser ability to make use of the geographical space in which they are fixed. As Ratzel (2009: 7) observed, "[t]he connection of the enlargement of the geographical horizon with political expansion is too evident to need much discussion." This ability could be generally assessed by the modes of resource exploitation, industrial output, scientific inventions, and other factors of Man's relations with Space.

These communities originally referred to political entities based on a strong sense of ethno-linguistic affinity. The German kultur was obviously the role-model, where sovereign borders were viewed as organic membranes separating communities with different raumsinn. Those with a greater (or stronger) sense of space tended to expand; those with a lesser (or weaker) sense of space tended to retract. A dilemma appears: when does raumsinn match the "right" Man-Space relationship? In other words, how much territory does a community need?

Modern scholarship has been swift in denouncing three of the major faults in such thinking. First, it expresses a positivist interpretation of social darwinism. Second, it is a form of determinism. Third, such intellectual foundations contributed to Nazi indoctrination, and military expansionism. While the first two are critiques worthy of more attention, the latter can only be overcome by a mature and thorough academic scrutiny. These claims notwithstanding, I repeat my call that a comprehensive study is forthcoming.

So how is raumsinn relevant to contemporary case studies, say in East Asia? Three examples should suffice to alert us to the importance of revisiting these classics.

First, Japan. The rising sun only bathes a total surface area of (377,944 km2), nearly half that of France (674,843 km2), and one with only ~12% of arable land (or ~60,000 km2), according to a recent World Bank survey. Incidentally, Portugal's surface is 93,000 km2. However, Japan's population totals ~126.6 million, to France's ~65.3 million, that is, more than double its size. In their resource-scarce archipelago, the Japanese people would find it impossible to maintain their current levels of development (e.g. industrial production, GDP-per capita, technical innovation and so forth). Concordantly, the Greater Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere of the 1930-40s and today's grand strategic options of economic interdependence with China and Southeast Asia share the same core principle of a raumsinn greater than the political frontiers of the Japanese state.

Second, Russia. The eurasian colossus boasts a total surface area of a staggering 17,075,400 km2, with a population of "only" ~143.3 million. Provided with huge tracts of land and privileged access to key resources, it has since its eastward expansion constantly faced tremendous problems developing its Far East. One of the incentives Japan has been waiving at the Russians in the context of the Northern Territories/Southern Kuriles ( 北方領土) dispute is the promise of great investments in this region if and when a peace treaty and territorial settlement is celebrated. A case can be presented of a Russian territory too immense to its raumsinn in terms of material development of the land and its population.

Third, China. Its extreme asymmetries provide no easy answer as we look into relations between urban and rural areas, the interior and coastal provinces, between the rich and the poor. The demographic pressure exercise by a population of nearly 1.3 billion people in a country of ~9.7 million km2, out of which a great percentage is occupied by mountains and deserts, does constrain the grand orientations of policymaking. Should we thus be surprised by the repeated expansion of Chinese communities into Russian Siberia due to a want of more arable land and greater living space? And what to say of China's global diaspora? Are they merely the result of poor internal economic and other indexes such as widespread poverty, endemic corruption, and overall political oversight of private affairs? Can we entertain the possibility of psycho-sociological factors pertaining to the relation between Man and Space being at play here?

Given these observations, I must again stress some caveats:

Are populations in all three countries shrinking? Yes.

Do material and ideational factors change over time? Yes.

Is a methodology to study these issues missing? Yes.

Do these caveats prevent us from undergoing new research paths? Hardly so. Deprived of any preliminary conclusions as today's strategic studies community may be, following these questions through could greatly benefit our overall understanding of the historic transformations currently sweeping East Asia. Failing to do so would reveal a conscious neglect on behalf of academia to face the great issues of the age.

This article has been written by:

Tiago Alexandre Fernandes Mauricio

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